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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-Right to Counsel-Custodial Criminal De-
fendant May Not Waive Right To Counsel In The Absence of His
Court-Appointed Attorney. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348
N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
Counsel was appointed for defendant Henry C. Hobson prior to
his placement in a lineup for a robbery unrelated to the charge on
which he was being held.' After Hobson was positively identified in
the lineup, his counsel left.' The defendant then signed an undes-
cribed form of waiver,3 and agreed to speak to a detective investi-
gating the robbery.4 Despite the detective's admitted knowledge
that defendant was represented by counsel, the detective made no
effort to inform counsel that he intended to speak to the client.5 The
detective read Hobson the standard pre-interrogation warnings' and
asked him if he understood his rights.7 Defendant replied that he
did, and in response to the detective's inquiries, verbally waived his
right to counsel and agreed to talk to the detective.' He then con-
fessed to the robbery in response to questioning, and was told that
he had been identified at the lineup.
Hobson was convicted, after a guilty plea, of robbery in the third
degree,9 following the denial of a motion to suppress his incriminat-
ing statements. 0 The appellate division" affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that once counsel
has been engaged in a criminal proceeding a defendant may not
waive his right to counsel when his lawyer is not present. 2 The court
1. People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
2. The right to counsel during lineup was secured by the following cases: United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
3. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (a knowing and intelligent waiver is required).
4. 39 N.Y.2d at 482, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
5. Id.
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), requires that a criminal defendant in
custody receive a four-fold warning of his rights:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
7. 39 N.Y.2d at 482, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
8. Id. at 482, 348 N.E.2d at 896-97, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
9. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.05 (McKinney 1975).
10. 39 N.Y.2d at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
11. 47 App. Div. 2d 716 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
12. 39 N.Y.2d at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
1977]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
of appeals especially emphasized the importance of a criminal de-
fendant's having undeniable access to counsel during interrogation
to ensure that any waiver of his rights will be truly knowing and
intelligent: ,1
Th[is] rule . . . breathes life into the requirement that a waiver of a consti-
tutional right must be competent, intelligent and voluntary . . . . Indeed,
it may be said that a right too easily waived is no right at all.
By so holding the court affirmed People v. Arthur, '1 the result of
eight years of strengthening the criminal defendant's right to coun-
sel, and reversed two cases that had challenged Arthur's import and
spirit.'"
In Arthur, counsel, who was representing defendant in another
matter, learned of defendant's arrest while watching the news on
television. Counsel went to the police station, identified himself,
and asked to speak to his client who was being questioned. Counsel
was told he could see defendant after the questioning was over. The
questioning resulted in a written, signed confession. After conferring
with defendant, counsel told police to "leave him alone" and left.
The next morning defendant was interrogated again in the absence
of counsel; and without waiving his right to counsel's presence,
made incriminating statements.'"
The court ruled that once an attorney enters the proceeding, the
police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel
unless there is an affirmative waiver of this right in the attorney's
presence. The court also noted that there is no requirement that
defendant or his attorney request the police to respect this right.'7
Thus, as a result of Arthur the police found themselves forced to
inform the attorney of an accused whenever they intended to inter-
rogate his client, and to wait until the attorney arrived before
commencing interrogation. The opinion seems to imply that if the
attorney does not wish to go to the station the police are helpless,
13. Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (citations omitted).
14. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
15. 39 N.Y.2d at 490, 348 N.E.2d at 902, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 426. The two cases are People
v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1971), cert. denied sub nor. Lopez
v. New York, 404 U.S. 840 (1971), and People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert. denied sub nor. Robles v. New York 401 U.S. 945 (1971). See text
accompanying notes 54-71 infra.
16. 22 N.Y.2d at 327, 239 N.E.2d at 537-38, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65.
17. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
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thereby putting the police at the whim and mercy of the defense
counsel."8 Although its opinion was surprisingly terse, the Arthur
court concluded that the necessity of requiring an intelligent and
voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel was more im-
portant than the probable inconveniences and possible damages
that might affect the police and law enforcement. Hobson's author,
Chief Judge Charles Breitel, clearly explained Arthur's rationale in
his earlier dissent in People v. Lopez:'"
It seems elementary that in the protection of individuals (even in civil
matters, let alone in criminal matters) waivers obtained in a pending action
in the absence of counsel are, in truth, a denial of the right to counsel in that
action. The denial is the more egregious where counsel is already retained or
assigned, but the frustration of the right may be as grave if the waiver comes
on the very eve of the inevitable retainer or assignment of counsel as is now
the case in criminal actions. Lip service is paid to the right, to be sure, and
counsel will be provided, but not until persons, already defendants in crimi-
nal actions, have first confessed under the most transparently manipulated
"voluntary" waivers of "known rights."
In affirming Arthur, the Hobson court focused on three major
points: that a waiver must be truly intelligent; that the Miranda
warnings are a feeble protection to the individual who is left alone
and unadvised to determine his needs;'" and that the principle of
stare decisis is "eminently desirable and essential."'"
The precedent upon which Arthur and Hobson were originally
constructed, and the progenitor of the New York right to counsel
during custodial interrogation, is People v. DiBiasi,22 in which the
18. Neither Arthur nor Hobson dealt with the possibility of a defense lawyer who might
intentionally stay away from the police station. The court of appeals also has not addressed
such issues as the type of deterrent measures that could, or should be invoked to prevent such
conduct. Since this is concerned with pre-trial conduct the court could not declare a mistrial
to remedy any injustice the client might suffer. The court of appeals has also failed to indicate
what might result if the police interrogated the defendant anyway when defense counsel
intentionally has not appeared, and how much time counsel should be given to appear after
he has been notified that the police wish to interrogate further his client.
19. 28 N.Y.2d 23, 29, 268 N.E.2d 628, 631, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, 830 (1971).
20. 39 N.Y.2d at 485, 348 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423. By this statement the
Hobson court was merely affirming the Supreme Court's intent as stated in Miranda v.
Arizona. Id. The Supreme Court stated that Miranda was not intended to set maximum
guidelines to ensure the criminal defendant's rights but only minimum standards, and that
the states may individually provide more if they wish. 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
21. 39 N.Y.2d at 487, 348 N.E.2d at 900, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
22. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
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defendant surrendered to the police on his attorney's advice six
years after he was indicted, and was thereupon questioned by the
District Attorney and the police in the absence of his attorney."3
Basing its decision upon the two concurring opinions of four United
States Supreme Court Justices in Spano v. New York,2" the court
of appeals held that this questioning after indictment and surrender
for arraignment was a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights and was so gross an error as to require reversal of his convic-
tion.2.
The next milestone was reached in 1961 with People v.
Waterman," in which an incriminating statement was excluded
even though the accused, questioned after the indictment and be-
fore arraignment, had not retained counsel. Although the court
emphasized that this holding was restricted to the post-indictment
situation," it unequivocally stated that the criminal defendant was
entitled to the presence of counsel during any "secret interroga-
tion."28
DiBiasi was extended significantly by People v. Meyer,2" in which.
the court excluded a voluntary, unsolicited statement of an unrepre-
sented accused to a police officer after arrest and arraignment but
before his indictment. The court reasoned that the arraignment
(and not the indictment) after arrest must be deemed the first stage
of a criminal proceeding and held therefore that a post-arraignment
statement "[in reason and logic" should not be treated any differ-
23. 7 N.Y.2d at 549, 166 N.E.2d at 827, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
24. 360 U.S. 315, 324-27 (1959). The Supreme Court held that the police overbore the
defendant's will and that therefore the confession was involuntary and not admissible. Id. at
324-27.
25. 7 N.Y.2d at 550-51, 166 N.E.2d at 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
26. 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961).
27. An indictment is "the formal commencement of the criminal action against the defen-
dant . . . [and! presumably imports that the People have legally sufficient evidence of the
defendant's guilt of the crime charged .... " 9 N.Y.2d at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 447, 216
N.Y.S.2d at 74.
28. 9 N.Y.2d at 565, 175 N.E.2d at 448, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 75; People v. Friedlander, 16
N.Y.2d 248, 212 N.E.2d 533, 265 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1965); People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 196
N.E.2d 261, 246 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1963).
29. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962). See also People v. Davis, 13
N.Y.2d 690, 691, 191 N.E.2d 674, 675, 241 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (1963). Meyer in turn was
extended by People v. Richardson, 25 App. Div. 2d 221, 224, 268 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1966),
to pre.arraignment statements, holding that the judicial process had begun and that therefore
the right to counsel attached.
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ently than a post-indictment statement2'3 The court concluded that
any statement made by an accused after arraignment or indictment,
not in the presence of counsel, is inadmissable.3 1
In People v. Donovan31 the court, in a landmark decision, declared
that the state's constitutional3 3 and statutory"4 provisions require
the exclusion of a defendant's confession that was obtained when he
was being interrogated while awaiting his arraignment, after his
lawyer had requested and been denied access, to him '.3  However,
while Donovan extended the court's protection of the criminal de-
fendant to new lengths, indications of discontent with this direction,
which eventually resulted in the People v. Robles31 decision, were
manifested. In a strongly worded, lengthy dissent, Judge Adrian D.
Burke argued: 7
Absent a clear violation of due process, the rule concerning the admissability
of confessions has always been treated by this court according to principles
of evidence, and not as a tool for the accomplishment of collateral purposes,
such as control of police procedures.
After the Arthur decision, the United States Supreme Court
handed down the landmark decisions of Escobedo v. Illinois" and
Miranda v. Arizona" which buttressed the criminal defendant's
constitutional right to counsel and his right not to incriminate him-
self.
In New York, these decisions were not revolutionary, for the court
of appeals in Donovan had already, explicitly extended the criminal
defendant's right to counsel beyond Escobedo and Miranda."' Dur-
30. 11 N.Y.2d at 164, 182 N.E.2d at 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 428. See also E. FIscH, FIscH
ON NEw YoRK EVIDENCE 324 (1975-76 Cumulative Supp.).
31. 11 N.Y.2d at 165, 182 N.E.2d at 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
32. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
33. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
34. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW §§ 170.10 (3), 170.10 (4)(a), 170.10 (6), 180.10 (3)-(5), 210.15
(2)43), 210.15 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (relating to the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to counsel).
35. 13 N.Y.2d at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 843. See also People v. McKie,
25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969); People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387,
207 N.E.2d 356, 259 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1965); People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366,
250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964).
36. 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970).
37. 13 N.Y.2d at 155, 193 N.E.2d at 632, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 846 (Burke, J., dissenting).
38. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40. 39 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 348 N.E.2d at 897-98, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. See People v. Dono-
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ing the next seven years the New York DiBiasi-Meyer and Donovan-
Arthur rules were modified and molded as the court sought to apply
the Miranda and Escobedo requirements.
People v. Rodney p.4 held, pursuant to Miranda, that only a
significant restraint under circumstances likely to affect the indi-
vidual's will substantially requires that Miranda warnings be given.
Less than one month later, People v. Vella,42 which the court of
appeals used as the basis for the Arthur decision,4" held that the
incriminating statements made by defendant were inadmissible
because his attorney from another, related criminal proceeding44
was not present.45
In People v. McKie" the court held defendant's incriminating
statements made on the street in the absence of his attorney to be
admissible although the police knew defendant was represented by
counsel. The crucial factor was that defendant was not in a cus-
todial surrounding.47 Apparently Rodney P. and Miranda were
deemed more relevant than Vella or Arthur.4" People v. Kaye,4" rely-
ing on Miranda's holding that volunteered statements of any kind
are not barred by the fifth amendment, ' accepted a voluntary con-
van, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (1963). It has also been
suggested that Donovan is the "seed from which sprang" Miranda and Escobedo. People v.
McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 24, 250 N.E.2d 36, 38, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534, 537 (1969).
41. 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967). In Rodney P. defendant con-
fessed in a non-custodial setting before he was arrested and given his Miranda warnings, and
later in the police station signed a written statement. Id. at 2-3, 233 N.E.2d at 256, 286
N.Y.S.2d at 226-27.
42. 21 N.Y.2d 249, 234 N.E.2d 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1967).
43. 22 N.Y.2d at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
44. Although the crimes were related, they were, as Judge Kenneth Keating noted in his
concurring opinion, technically separate, distinct offenses. 21 N.Y.2d at 251, 234 N.E.2d at
423, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
45. Id. at 251, 234 N.E.2d at 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
46. 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969).
47. Id. at 26-28, 250 N.E.2d at 39-40, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 538-40.
48. The McKie court stated that although the police knew the defendant was represented
by counsel, this fact was not significant. Id. at 28, 250 N.E.2d at 41, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
The court in Arthur in interpreting New York's pre-Miranda cases came to the opposite
conclusion: "[Once the police know or have been apprised of the fact that the defendant is
represented by counsel or that an attorney has communicated with the police for the purpose
of representing the defendant, the accused's right to counsel attaches .. " 22 N.Y.2d at 329,
239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. It is this right to counsel that the Arthur waiver rule
was based upon.
49. 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969).
50. 25 N.Y.2d at 144, 250 N.E.2d at 331, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 45. However, Judge Burke, in
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fession made in the absence of defendant's retained lawyer',
Then, even as the court of appeals seemed to be molding the
Donovan-Arthur doctrine into a clear and well-defined form, the
court handed down People v. Robles," one of the two cases which
Hobson overrules. Robles marked a turning point since it seemed to
signal that the court would be less technical and less protective of
the criminal defendant's right. Defense counsel, after talking with
his client, in the police station, requested a detective to watch his
client.13 In response to two sympathic questions asked by the de-
tective, who had known the defendant previously, the defendant
confessed while his attorney was in another part of the building. 4
Robles decided that Arthur did not render the confession
inadmissible, describing Arthur's holding as "merely a theoretical
statement" and a "dogmatic claim." 5 Relying on Rodney P.'s hold-
ing that admissions are inadmissible only when made under circum-
stances that will substantially affect the defendant's free will,"6 the
Robles court decided that a suspect's earlier representation by coun-
sel should not give him a special privilege over one not represented,57
and thus the Arthur rule should not be applicable unless, as in
Vella, there is evidence of conduct which would indicate an inten-
tion to victimize the defendant or outwit his attorney." The court,
over a strong dissent,59 decided that there was no such evidence,
his dissenting opinion in McKie, propounded that "[sluch reasoning confuses the Fifth with
the Sixth Amendments and, by so doing, distorts prior decisions of this court." 25 N.Y.2d at
31, 250 N.E.2d at 42, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 543. (Burke, J. dissenting).
51. Hobson recognized the validity of McKie and Kaye and used them as examples to
show that the Arthur rule is not an absolute. 39 N.Y.2d at 483, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
52. 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970).
53. Id. at 157, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
54. Id. at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95. See also note 59 infra.
55. 27 N.Y.2d at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
56. Id. at 158-59, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
57. Id. at 159, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795. The point that a suspect's earlier
representation by counsel should not give him a special privilege had been one of the major
grounds upon which the rationale of the Arthur rule had been attacked. See People v. McKie,
25 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 250 N.E.2d at 40, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40. Arthur did note this dissatisfac-
tion, however, and rebutted, "while it is true that the defendants in Donovan, Gunner, and
Failla were represented by retained counsel, the holdings ... were not dependent upon that
factor." 22 N.Y.2d at 328, 239 N.E.2d at 538, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
58. 27 N.Y.2d at 159, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
59. Judge Breitel's dissent characterized the defendant's confessions not as an
"impetuous unbosoming" of defendant's guilt as did the majority, 27 N.Y.2d at 159, 263
N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 796, but rather as an extraction by "systematic questioning
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concluded that the confession was spontaneous and voluntary, and
affirmed defendant's conviction on two counts of murder.60
The Robles decision found quick, if not overwhelming judicial
support.' Within the next two years one court of appeals case sup-
ported, 2 and two cases effectively affirmed 3 Robles, thereby in-
creasing its influence and essentially emasculating the DiBiasi-
following an initial sympathetic comment designed to invite an outpouring of [guilt.
Id. at 160, 263 N.E.2d at 306, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (Breitel, J., dissenting). Actually, the
policeman's question to the defendant seems essentially rhetorical: "[Did you ever think it
would wind up like this?" Id. at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 794. Since it was
posed in a basically low pressure, non-interrogatory setting to consider it to be a deprivation
of defendant's constitutional rights seems to be utilizing a rather extreme form of a domino
theory, viz., that once you allow a policeman to express a sentiment to the prisoner you are
infringing, or laying the groundwork for the infringement of the prisoner's rights.
Even if Judge Breitel was over-eager in attempting to preserve the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants, he was correct in noting that the defendant's statements were made in
his counsel's absence, regardless of how close they were to each other (about 18 feet apart in
one instance). He also noted that the Arthur rule was not accorded the basic privilege of the
stare decisis doctrine by the majority. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra. Finally,
Judge Breitel concluded that the majority seemed to be downgrading misguidedly the right
to counsel by relying solely on the right against self-incrimination. 27 N.Y.2d at 161, 263
N.E.2d at 307, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 797. See note 52 supra.
60. 27 N.Y.2d at 159-60, 263 N.E.2d at 306, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795-96. Robles was not
immediately understood:
What is the precise basis for the holding in the Robles case? Is it simply a case where
the defendant's statements were regarded as having been voluntarily made and not the
product of custodial interrogation? See People v. Pellicano, 40 App. Div. 2d 169, 175,
338 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837. Or is it a holding that once a defendant has consulted with
his counsel, he may thereafter, in the absence of counsel, waive his Donovan-Arthur
rights and speak of his guilt? People v. Pellicano, supra, 40 App. Div.2d at 171, 338
N.Y.S.2d at 833-34. Or does the fact that the attorney, after consulting the defen-
dant, was physically present in the same building at all relevant times deprive the
defendant of his Donovan-Arthur rights? Or is it a combination of all these factors
which lies at the basis of the Robles decision?
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 545, at 548 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
61. However, commentators did not regard the decision with such esteem. The decision
was described as "supercilious" and "sophistic" by one, who predicted that the ruling would
lead only to abuse. Lewin, Criminal Procedure, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 381, 400 (1971). It has
also been propounded that when Robles distinguished itself from Arthur it overlooked the
existence of the second, oral statement which was the basis for the Arthur decision. 20
BUFFALO L. REV. 704, 710 (1971). Although in Arthur counsel was denied access to his client
for the first, written statement, counsel had already been granted access for the later state-
ment.
62. People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
63. People v. Wooden, 31 N.Y.2d 753, 290 N.E.2d 436, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434, cert. denied,
410 U.S. 987 (1973); People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert.
denied sub nom. Lopez v. New York, 404 U.S. 840 (1971).
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Arthur line of cases. People v. Taylo 4 limited Vella by holding that
the latter comes into play only when the police or prosecutor learn
that an attorney has been secured to assist the accused in defending
against the "specific charges" for which he is held."' People v.
Lopez," ignored Arthur7 and declared that the right to counsel and
the right to remain silent may be validly waived after the defendant
has been indicted. In addition the court held that the failure to
inform the defendant that he had been indicted was neither willful
concealment nor prejudicial. " The third case, People v. Wooden,"
affirmed without opinion a conviction based on incriminating post-
indictment statements made in the absence of counsel.
Robles, Lopez and Wooden seemed to have put to rest the entire
DiBiasi-Meyer rule that excluded post-indictment or post-
arraignment incriminating statements made in the absence of coun-
sel, and the Donovan-Arthur rule that forbade the waiving of the
right to counsel, except in counsel's presence, after counsel has been
retained.
Thus Hobson's impact is enormous. It resurrects these two rules,
overrules Robles and Lopez,70 and reaffirms Vella. Equally impor-
tant is its emphasis on the necessity of observing the doctrine of
stare decisis. Hopson attempts to ensure that three similar cases,
one without opinion and all decided by the closest of margins, could
never again overturn an established, consciously evolved doctrine
and outlook.
64. 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
65. Id. at 332, 266 N.E.2d at 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
66. 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1971).
67. The Lopez court said that People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 213 N.E.2d 441, 266
N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965), which allowed oral waiver of these rights, was controlling. 28 N.Y.2d at
25, 268 N.E.2d at 629, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 826. It might be argued, as Lopez does, that Arthur
is not controlling because in that case counsel had already arrived, before the incriminating
statements were made, whereas in Lopez counsel had not arrived. However, Judge Breitel's
dissent noted that by permitting a defendant to waive counsel while held incommunicado the
right to counsel is debased and negated, thereby significantly affecting Arthur's rule. 28
N.Y.2d at 29, 268 .N.E.2d at 631, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 830. See note 72 infro.
68. 28 N.Y.2d at 26, 268 N.E.2d at 629, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 827. Defendant later brought his
case to federal court, where his conviction was reversed. United States ex rel Lopez v. Zelker,
344 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 409
U.S. 1049 (1972). The district court excluded defendant's incriminatory statements made in
the absence of his counsel and stated that the state failed to carry its burden of showing
harmlessness in not telling defendant he was indicted. 344 F. Supp. at 1055.
69. 31 N.Y.2d 753, 290 N.E,2d 436, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972).
70. 39 N.Y.2d at 490, 348 N.E.2d at 902, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
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Devoting nearly half of its opinion to a discussion of stare decisis,
the Hobson court took care to distinguish between a mechanical
adherence to precedent and the respect that each court should give
to it. Chief Judge Breitel stated the court must be certain of error
before it overturns a precedent"' that is the result of painstaking and
reasoned analysis72 and involves statutory or constitutional interpre-
tation.Hobson's re-emphasis on fortifying the criminal defendant's right
to counsel was corroborated six months later by People v. Ramos,73
wherein the court ruled that an affirmative action by a defendant's
lawyer" would invoke the protections of the Donovan-Arthur-
Hobson rule.75 In Ramos defendant's retained counsel for an unre-
lated drug charge simply advised defendant not to make any state-
ments to the police concerning the robbery and murder charges,
which were the subject of the case."
New York's trend towards buttressing the criminal defendant's
protections is especially noteworthy in view of the United States
Supreme Court's recent limitations on defendant's rights. The Su-
preme Court seems to be intent on withdrawing, or at least constru-
ing as strictly as possible, the protective devices that many felt the
Miranda and Escobedo decisions demanded or augured.
Thus in recent years the Court has ruled that even though a
criminal defendant has neither received nor effectively waived coun-
sel, his statements made in custody may be used to impeach his
credibility at trial."
The Court has also ruled that a criminal prosecution does not
begin until indictment or formal charges are brought and therefore
71. Id. at 489, 348 N.E.2d at 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
72. Id. at 490, 348 N.E.2d at 902, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
73. 40 N.Y.2d 610, 357 N.E.2d 955, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1976).
74. Id. at 612, 357 N.E.2d at 957, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 301. The lawyer's affirmative action
consisted of telling both a police detective and defendant that he advised defendant not to
make any statements to the police. Id.
75. Id. at 614, 357 N.E.2d at 958, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 302. Defendant was presented with an
outstanding arrest warrant by a police detective just as his arraignment for an unrelated drug
charge had been concluded.
76. Id. at 612, 357 N.E.2d at 957, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 301. As the prosecution contended, this
was the lawyer's only connection with the second charge. Id. at 617, 357 N.E.2d at 960, 389
N.Y.S.2d at 304. Defendant's guilty plea to manslaughter one was vacated, and the case was
restored to its pre-pleading status. Id. at 619, 357 N.E.2d at 962, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
77. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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the right to counsel does not attach until that point.5 In a separate
case, the Court ruled that the right to counsel does not attach at a
post-indictment "photographic lineup."79 Most recently the Court
has held that the police may renew the questioning of a suspect who
has exercised his right to remain silent when the renewed question-
ing is about another, unrelated crime 0
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent tilt in the other direction,
and pressures created by an overloaded judicial system and the
increase of crime, Hobson seems to indicate that the New York
Court of Appeals will continue to protect the criminal defendant's
right to counsel.
Stuart J. Feld
78. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion). Kirby saw itself as the
latest in a long line of cases that began with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and ended
with Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Id.
79. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
80. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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